

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM OF BRIEFING

PRESENT: Henry A. Kissinger
General Haig
David R. Young (Note Taker)

SUBJECT: Laos (Lamson 719)
Cambodia (Toan Thang) 01/71

BRIEFER: Lt. Colonel Martin

DATE: March 13, 1971, 9:00-9:15 a.m.

LAOS

Martin: The ARVN is moving some of its airborne units north seeing if they can get some contact north of Route 9 and east of Tchepone. Within the last 24 hours they have ^{had} six contacts with the enemy, five were friendly initiated but they were all small.

Kissinger: I will tell you their strategy. They have gotten most of their supplies past Tchepone. They fought like hell while they were trying to get them through, but now that they have gotten them through, they don't care. They'll let the ARVN move around up there.

Martin: I'm not so sure about that, but I do know that we don't see any major units now either north or northeast of Tchepone.

Kissinger: Will the ARVN stay in and try to disrupt supplies until the end of April?

Martin: Admiral Moorer will be briefing you on this.

Kissinger: Well, what is your personal view then?

Martin: Yes, I think that they will stay in.

Kissinger: Have they uncovered any new caches?

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Martin: No, they haven't and I don't think that they will until they get further down into the Binh Trams areas.

Kissinger: What are the sensor readings?

Martin: There is still some traffic, but it is probably local -- around the Binh Tram but not north or south of it. You will notice an increase of traffic on Route 23, but there they are more out in the open.

CAMBODIA

Martin: It looks as if they are starting to move up and around and will eventually move into the Chup Plantation. General Knowles has a great deal of confidence in Minh; however, he is more conservative than Tri and this may become a problem. The original plan was to go in a wider sweep around Chup to the north/northeast and then to turn west. Their present movement seems to be a shortcut. The ostensible reason is to follow the B-52 strikes to see what the results were. However, they may have decided to try to go into Chup earlier or they may be trying to avoid some contact with the forces to the northeast where they were intending to go through.

Haig: I really think that Minh wants to act more defensively, we have three recent CIA reports to this effect.

Kissinger to Haig: I want you to be sure to see Davidson when you get out there and find out what the story is. Why has it bogged down?

Kissinger: I really liked the way that Tri behaved and conducted his operation. It was masterful. He had been maneuvering them, breaking them up and then he was going to hit them.

Both Kissinger and Martin agreed that Minh seems to be avoiding contact. Martin then showed Dr. Kissinger two different maps of the enemy deployments - one showing deployments today, and one for about February 10.

Martin: These changes indicate to me that they are pulling back and going into their base areas. They had massed but now they are dispersing. The name of the game now seems to be pursuit. In the Snoul area the ARVN

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unit is just sitting there. It hasn't moved for several weeks and the enemy is moving in around them from all sides. It is just a matter of time before they get hit. And when they do they are going to get clobbered.

End of Briefing.

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